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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 10-3377 
____________ 
 
EMILY WILSON, 
 
                                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 09-cv-00787) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Junior 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 26, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 27, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Emily Wilson appeals the District Court’s summary judgment on her Title VII 
claims for gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.  We will 
affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its careful and thorough 
2 
 
opinion. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts, and we do so 
in the light most favorable to Wilson.   
 Wilson worked as a program technician at the Consolidated Farm Service Agency
1 
(CFSA) in Bucks County, Pennsylvania from 2002 to 2007. 
 In 2004, Wilson’s supervisor, County Executive Director Darrell Tribue, filed a 
complaint with the CFSA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO), alleging that 
he had been wrongfully disciplined after protesting the consolidation of two CFSA 
offices.  Tribue later stated that Wilson “was called as a witness” in the 2004 complaint. 
In 2006, CFSA’s Deputy Administrator for Field Operations (DAFO) in 
Washington, D.C. adopted a plan to correct perceived staffing disparities across 
Pennsylvania’s CFSA offices.  In response to this initiative, the Pennsylvania State 
Committee directed the Bucks County Committee to reassign one of its workers to 
Chester County.  The Bucks County Committee selected Wilson—the most recent hire—
for reassignment, but expressed its displeasure at having to reassign one of its “valued 
staff members.” 
 On December 15, 2006, Wilson received a letter from the State Committee 
                                                 
1
 The CFSA is a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture that 
administers federal conservation and agricultural credit programs through state and 
county committees. 
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offering her a position in Chester County and warning her that if she “refuse[d] to accept 
this reassignment, it may be necessary to separate [her] from the service.”  Wilson 
declined the position and failed to report to work as required by the reassignment.  Nine 
days later, on February 27, 2007, the State Committee notified Wilson that her 
employment was slated for termination within thirty days and offered her the chance to 
respond verbally or in writing to the proposed termination. 
On March 8, 2007, Wilson’s counsel sent a “notice of a formal charge of 
retaliation” to Richard Pallman, the Executive Director of the State Committee.  The 
letter alleged that the Committee failed “to afford Ms. Wilson the same privileges, terms 
and conditions of employment as other employees who declined to accept reassignment 
beyond the established local commuting area.”  The State Committee did not respond to 
Wilson’s March 8th letter and sent formal notice of her discharge on April 2, 2007.  Two 
days later, CFSA offered Wilson $3,955.80 in severance pay, which she eventually 
accepted.  Wilson also requested an administrative hearing before the DAFO, pursuant to 
CFSA’s Employee Handbook 22-PM.  The DAFO responded that it would hold the 
hearing “in abeyance pending possible settlement” of her claims in EEO mediation. 
Unsatisfied with the conduct of the agency, Wilson brought suit in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, 
and hostile work environment, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  The District Court entered summary judgment against 
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Wilson, holding that she could not show that the Secretary’s stated reason for termination 
was pretextual.  The District Court also found the record devoid of evidence to support 
her hostile work environment claim.  This timely appeal followed.
2 
II 
 We review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo, and apply the same 
standard as the District Court.  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
A 
Wilson alleged that her reassignment and termination were motivated by gender.  
As the District Court correctly noted, Wilson’s reassignment claim is a non-starter 
because the Bucks County Committee selected Wilson for reassignment, and Wilson 
never claimed that the County Committee discriminated against her on the basis of 
gender. 
With regard to Wilson’s termination claim, the District Court assumed that Wilson 
satisfied the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, but held that she could not show 
pretext.  Wilson argues on appeal that the District Court erroneously discounted evidence 
in the record that the Bucks County Office was understaffed.  But this fact, assuming it is 
true, bears only on Wilson’s reassignment claim, not her termination claim. 
 Wilson also contends the District Court erred in finding no evidence that the State 
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
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Committee “treated other, similarly situated [male employees] . . .  more favorably” than 
it treated her.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).  We disagree.  The 
District Court correctly noted that Wilson cited no valid comparator.  Although Wilson 
adverted to fourteen male employees of CFSA who were not terminated, she proffered 
nothing about them other than their names.  This falls well short of satisfying her burden 
under Fuentes. 
Finally, Wilson argues that the State Committee’s failure to follow its own policies 
is evidence of pretext.  We perceive no error in the District Court’s analysis in this 
respect.  Wilson received the severance pay to which she was entitled, the agency was 
permitted to hold the DAFO hearing in abeyance pending mediation of Wilson’s EEO 
claim, and regardless of the accuracy of her supervisor’s testimony that the termination 
was “disciplinary,” the State Committee had a right to terminate Wilson after she failed to 
report for duty. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment on 
Wilson’s claim for gender discrimination. 
B 
 Wilson also alleged retaliatory discharge on the basis of her participation in 
Tribue’s EEO complaint and her objections to CFSA’s proposed reassignment and 
termination.  The District Court found no causal link between these protected activities 
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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and Wilson’s termination.  See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001). 
On appeal, Wilson points to Tribue’s testimony that she “was called as a witness” 
in his 2004 complaint for wrongful discipline.  However, Wilson testified at her 
deposition that her name never appeared on a witness list and she never testified before 
the EEO.  The District Court did not err in relying upon Wilson’s testimony to find that 
the State Committee was unaware of her EEO activity when it terminated her in 2007. 
 Wilson also claims she was targeted for termination because the Bucks County 
Committee protested her proposed reassignment in October and November of 2006.  
However, the Bucks County Committee merely noted its disagreement with the State 
Committee’s decision to reassign one its “valued staff members.”  If anything, these 
protestations demonstrate that although the County Committee was forced to reassign one 
of its workers, its decision to nominate Wilson was entirely within its control. 
Nor did Wilson adduce any evidence supporting her claim that she was retaliated 
against because of her March 8, 2007 letter.  As the District Court found, the State 
Committee had already resolved to discharge Wilson well before she sent this letter.  The 
December 15, 2006 letter specifically warned Wilson of that possibility and Wilson 
conceded that she reviewed the CFSA’s policy in this regard.  And although Wilson’s 
final termination notice came after the March 8, 2007 letter, it adopted the language of 
February’s proposed termination in its entirety and came, as promised, thirty-three days 
after Wilson received notice of her potential termination. 
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Accordingly, the District Court did not err in entering summary judgment against 
Wilson on her retaliation claim. 
C 
 Turning to Wilson’s hostile work environment claim, we agree with the District 
Court that “[t]he record is completely devoid of evidence that plaintiff’s workplace was 
hostile or abusive.”  To survive summary judgment on a claim for hostile work 
environment, Wilson had to present some evidence that her workplace was “permeated 
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Because the factual record adduced at the summary judgment stage fell well below 
this high standard, the District Court did not err in this regard and we will affirm its 
judgment in all respects. 
